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Introduction
In developed economies, increasing shares of the population are entering retirement rather than engaging in productive work. As a result, to ensure future individual and societal welfare, it may be crucial to delay the average age of transition from the labour force into retirement. To improve incentives related to delaying retirement age, governments in many countries have already issued changes in pension systems. In addition to such policies, the OECD proposes measures related to the concept of "active aging", e.g. measures to encourage the retraining of older workers (OECD, 1998 (OECD, , 2001 ). Similar reasoning is present in the European Union's "Lisbon strategy" for growth and jobs (EU 2007 (EU , 2008 . The underlying view is that inadequate education, particularly among low-skilled individuals, is an important cause for early retirement because it increases the risk of becoming unemployed and decreases an individual's chances of receiving job offers.
The purpose of this paper is to study whether adult education at the compulsory or upper secondary level (henceforth AE) that takes place at the age of 42 or later affects the timing of the transition from productive work to a life financed by pensions. To our knowledge, this topic has not been previously addressed, presumably because it requires very long time-series data on earnings and training. The analysis is based on Swedish register data of AE transcripts from 1979 to 2004 and labour earnings from 1982 to 2004. Sweden is a suitable country for our study because, since 1969, the Swedish government has mandated that municipalities offer education for adults at the compulsory and upper secondary levels. Participation is free of charge, and full-time students are eligible to apply for financial support amounting to about €780 per month (2004 prices); one-third of this amount is a grant, and the rest is a loan with favourable conditions. 1 In the 1980s, around 100,000 individuals were enrolled annually.
Although these numbers include those who were only enrolled in just a single course, it can be compared to the roughly 300,000 adolescents enrolled in regular upper secondary school for youths. In an international comparison, participation in AE is high in Sweden.
According to human capital theory, individuals invest in education at any point during the life cycle if the present value of benefits from education exceeds the costs (Becker 1962) . Education is assumed to increase productivity and therefore to increase an individual's wages. On the cost side, time in education invokes foregone earnings besides the direct costs for education. A general implication of restrictive versions of human capital theory is that the returns to additional investments in education decrease with an individual's age. This is because the individual has fewer remaining years in the workforce and because of increased foregone earnings (Becker, 1993) . These circumstances may question the rationale of policies promoting AE later in life.
However, even if returns decrease with age, they may still be positive for older workers. In addition, extending the earlier versions of the human capital model to include factors like changes in information, relative wages, preferences, health and/or borrowing constraints (Altonji, 1993 , Iwahashi, 2004 , Killingsworth, 1982 , Monks, 1998 , Sjögren and Sällström, 2004 , Wallace and Ihnen, 1975 , Weiss, 1971 , it is possible that the returns to education do not fall monotonically with age and that the optimal timing of substantial investments in education will occur at a fairly late stage in the life cycle. Several empirical studies have found that the earnings returns of education among individuals above age 40 are comparable to those of younger age groups (Jacobson et al., 2005a , 2005b , Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008 ). 2 However, increased earnings have theoretically ambiguous implications for the timing of retirement. In a static model of labour supply, higher income may increase the demand for leisure, if leisure is a normal good, and decrease the labour supply. In a dynamic setting, assuming that an individual maximises life-time utility from income streams from work and income as a retired person, the sign of the effect of increased wages on the optimal timing of retirement cannot be determined a priori (Stock and Wise 1990) . Wage increases affect income both from work and from pensions, which may lead to earlier or later retirement depending on, for example, the shape of the utility function, subjective time preferences, and the link between income from work and pension entitlement. 3 Whether an earnings increase reflects increased productivity or signaling effects (Spence 1973 , Weiss 1995 makes no difference in this respect.
Empirical studies tend to suggest that low-skilled individuals are more likely to retire early. Among the mechanisms that may explain this pattern, technological changes have been claimed to work to the relative disadvantage of older workers (Aubert et al., 2006, Borghans and Weel, 2002) . 4 AE is potential insurance against such a scenario because broadened and updated skills may improve the employability of individuals and, from a more long-term perspective, make him/her less sensitive to structural changes in labour demand. Indeed, Peracchi and Welch (1994) suggest that high-skilled older workers are less likely to leave full-time employment, and Blau (1994) finds high-skilled more closely attached to the labour market and less sensitive to labour market shocks. These findings may partly reflect the apparent complementarity between on-the-job-training and formal education observed among older workers by Schils and Fouarge (2007) . 5 Another possible explanation is that education is correlated with health. Kalwij and Vermeulen (2005) argue that health is an important factor in explaining labour force participation among the elderly, while Lleras-Muney (2005) shows evidence of education's causal effect on decreasing mortality. Thus, empirical studies point to some potential and intuitively reasonable mechanisms lending support to the policy recommendations of the EU and the OECD, that is, investment in adult education might postpone the timing of retirement. The aim of our analysis is to study whether this view finds support in the data.
The contribution of the present study is that it directly addresses the issue of whether AE prolongs working careers. Unlike earlier studies of the effect of AE on earnings, this paper analyses the potential effects on labour supply up to and beyond the official retirement age. Irrespective of earnings effects, extending the working life for the elderly may mitigate the negative economic and social impacts of ageing populations. Moreover, given labour market imperfections, increased labour force participation has beneficial effects on the economy at large because it increases competition for jobs and moderates labour supply shortages during economic booms. the However, as pointed out before, the theoretical effects of AE on the transition from work force into retirement are indeterminate. Our main finding in this study is that AE has no effect on the timing of retirement from the labour market. This result is stable across a number of robustness checks.
The paper consists of five sections. Section 2 presents the institutional setting, the data and the design of the study. The empirical method is specified in Section 3; the res titutional setting, data and definitions
In Sweden, eligibility for higher education at the university level requires 12 years of e years since the s and is free of charge. It is primarily of interest to those who spe ults are presented and discussed in Section 4, before some concluding remarks in Section 5. IFAU -Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? Including individuals who attended junior secondary school (realskolan), which encompassed up to 10 years of schooling. c) The inland of Norrland is a sparsely populated area in the north of Sweden with permanently higher than average unemployment rates. Stockholm County hosts 20 per cent of the population, and the overall employment level is higher than in any other region of Sweden.
The descriptives in Table 1 reveal that education late in life is predominantly a female phenomenon. We do not explore the potential mechanisms behind this pattern, but greater family commitment is likely to be correlated with a greater need and/or desire to go back to school after age 40. Note also that those in AE are on average slightly younger by 1.8 years (males) and by 1.5 years (females). We also observe that the treated have a higher level of education. This is an expected pattern because earlier studies have shown that initial skill level is positively correlated with the willingness to participate in adult education (Oosterbeek 1998 , OECD 2003 , 2006 . The opportunity costs of participating in AE should also influence the decision to enrol.
Consequently, treated individuals had lower average earnings in both 1982 and 1985 and were also more likely to be receiving unemployment benefits during 1985, although the fractions doing so are only around 10 per cent. 6 Regional labour market conditions potentially influence the effects of AE. Helpfully, the means of the regional employment rates are almost identical between treated and comparison groups. We do not take migration after AE into account when assessing the potential effects of AE since mobility may be an endogenous outcome of treatment. 7 The lower half of Table   1 contains the corresponding descriptive characteristics of individuals born in 1944,
i.e. controlling for age. The differences in averages for the treated and comparison groups display patterns similar to those in the upper half of the table. Table 2 presents descriptive data on the actual AE undertaken by the treated individuals. We observe the number of credits and the level of each course (i.e., compulsory or upper secondary); we also categorise each course based on its name.
We do not observe whether the courses are completed, and there is no information on diplomas awarded. Course registrations on average amount to 390 credits for males and 458 credits for females, where 500 course credits correspond to a school year to AE, on-the-job-training may be a factor for both treated and untreated individuals.
We do not have information on this issue, but such training typically has relatively short duration, with low-skilled individuals underrepresented among the participants (Brunello 2001 , Arulampala et al. 2004 . It is possible that some individuals merely "consume" AE and attend a course in carpentry or a foreign language without the purpose of enhancing their labour market productivity. This is difficult to address because we do not know why individuals enrol; however, a rudimentary check is made in the empirical section insofar as we increase the lower bound of registered course credits in our definition of the treatment group. The outcome of interest in this study is the timing of the transition from productive work to dependence on transfers related to retirement pensions of different forms. The economics literature does not seem to have developed a consensus view on how to measure this transition (Denton and Spencer 2008) . Our approach is to define a ratio, r it , for an individual i in year t between income from pensions p it and annual labour earnings e it (in 100s of SEK). The ratio can be written explicitly as
where (+1) is included in the denominator to avoid division by zero. For comparability with future studies, the empirical section contains several alternative threshold values of r it , but our benchmark is that individuals are classified as active in the labour market as long as r it ≤ 1, meaning that the duration outcome is defined as the number of years, beginning in 1990, during which an individual has enjoyed labour earnings that exceed (or are equal to) the sum of pension transfers. 9 Duration may be censored due to events such as death, migration abroad, or enrolment in AE. 10 The latter is only possible for individuals in the untreated group. For our purposes, it is important that an observation satisfying our definition of retirement (r it > 1) is not followed by re-entry into the labour market (r it ≤ 1) in subsequent years. However, such events are rare and concern less than 1 per cent of the treated and untreated samples. Another issue is that of part-time retirees, who in our benchmark definition are assumed to remain in the labour force as long as their earnings exceed their pension transfers. This matter is addressed in the empirical section by allowing the threshold value of r it to vary.
Figures 1 and 2 focus on treated and untreated individuals and separately describe their duration in the labour force using Kaplan-Meier survival functions, i.e. the proportion of individuals surviving (r it ≤ 1) at least up to year t. For both males and females, survival rates are significantly higher for the treated. This descriptive data is not expected to reflect a causal effect of AE. In particular, the average age of the treated is slightly lower, something that may drive the differences in survival rates. An alternative view of the same data is given in Figures A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix, where the differences in survival functions between the treated and untreated are displayed. This is the format of illustration that we will use in the empirical section.
To investigate how age may influence survival rates, Table 3 presents a snapshot of cohort-specific proportions of individuals still active on the labour market (r it < 1) in 1997 among treated and untreated (proportions in italics). 11 As expected, the comparisons never exceeds 20 credits (i.e. about ten days) 9 p it is the sum of part-time pensions, retirement (i.e. old-age) pensions, national supplementary pensions (ATP), and early-retirement pensions, including sickness pensions and various occupational pensions. 10 Until 2004, the last year of observation, the proportion of censored individuals was below 4.5 per cent. 11 The macroeconomic background made the probability of retirement higher during the economic downturn at the beginning of the 1990s, but note that the regime under which individuals retire is the same for the treated and the untreated at different points in time.
proportions defined as "active" tend to decrease with age, particularly as the age of 65 approaches. In most occupations, the officially stated age of retirement is 65, but early retirement is generally allowed beginning at the age of 60. 12 More than 40 per cent of our sample is still classified as active on the labour market during the year in which they turn 64; thereafter, the percentages decrease to about 15 per cent at the age of 65
and below 2 per cent at the age of 66. Among treated females, the proportion of individuals active on the labour market is higher than among untreated females. For males, the number of treated becomes somewhat low when separated into different cohorts, but a relatively stable pattern emerges as the treated demonstrate a lower proportion of active individuals than untreated (except for 62-and 64-year-olds). It indicates that the higher survival rate for treated males displayed in Figure 1 was driven at least partially by their lower average age. 12 Blöndahl and Scarpetta (1999) estimate the average age of transition to inactivity in 1995. For Sweden, this was found to be 63 for males and 62 for females. The corresponding figures for the US were 64 and 62 years of age, and for Germany, they were 61 for males and 58 for females. Labour force participation and employment rates among 55-64 year olds are higher in Sweden than the OECD average. See also Hallberg (2004, 2006) and Karlström et al. (2004) .
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Empirical method
We aim to estimate the causal effect of AE on the timing of exit from the labour force, where AE and exit (r it > 1) are defined as in Section 2. For this purpose, we use the Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974 , Holland, 1986 ) and the matching estimators adapted for duration outcomes in de Luna and Johansson (2007) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) .
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Our empirical strategy assumes a selection mechanism (into AE) based on observables. The presentation below includes a detailed discussion of why this assumption is reasonable in our context.
For a given individual, let T(1) and T(0) denote the timing of his/her exit from the labour force if treated (AE) or not treated, respectively. One of these two potential outcomes will always be missing because we will observe the outcome either with or without AE. Treated individuals are matched with a comparison group, which we obtain by nearest-neighbour matching on the propensity score and by selecting four untreated individuals with propensity scores closest to those of each given participant in AE. 13 The propensity scores are estimated probabilities of being among the treated, using probit models (the choice of covariates is presented below). We define the (B) Conditional on the covariates, the probability of treatment is strictly positive and strictly smaller than one.
(C) Conditional on the covariates, the mechanism of enrolment into AE is independent of the potential outcomes.
(D) Conditional on the covariates, the different censoring mechanisms are independent of the outcomes.
14 In Table A .1 in the Appendix, the probit estimates of the propensity score are presented for females and males, while the results of the balancing tests are given in Table A .2 in the Appendix. The balancing tests involve all covariates that theoretically may explain AE enrolment, and they show that the AE and matched groups are comparable in the sense that, for any of the covariates, the equality of their respective 13 We match on the propensity score, i.e. the probability of entering AE conditional on the covariates; see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for a theoretical justification. Matching all covariates may be difficult due to "the curse of dimensionality." That is, finding close matches on many dimensions is not possible. 14 As mentioned in Section 2, censoring is associated with death, migration abroad and, for the comparison group, enrolment in AE. To identify causal effects of AE, it is crucial that assumption (C) above is not violated by unobservable factors that affect both AE participation and the timing of the exit. We see three main factors that can confound the effect of AE participation on exit from the labour force. First, individuals with a higher level of ability and/or motivation may systematically enrol in AE and, at some future point in time, decide to retire later as a result of the same characteristics that made them enrol. Conversely, if AE is considered a leisure activity, then participants might value leisure (and/or household work) more highly and thus tend to retire earlier. with earnings is that it is a continuous variable with a fair amount of variation, reflecting both productivity and willingness to work (as it is composed of the level of wages and number of hours worked). Note also that zero earners were excluded in the construction of our samples (see Section 2). Via interaction variables, the coefficients associated with earnings and earnings squared in 1985 are allowed to vary between cohorts born in different years. This approach appears reasonable, especially since several influential studies have found earnings before treatment to be a powerful control for self-selection into training programs (Heckman et al. 1999 , Glazerman 2003 , Smith and Todd 2005 . With respect to leisure preferences, we presume that those interested in AE as a leisure activity would only sporadically register for courses. This is one reason why we set the minimum threshold value at half a semester of full-time study to define AE and include robustness checks with even higher thresholds. Also, as earnings levels should contain information on individual preferences for leisure, as they partly reflect the number of hours worked, as well as an individual's costs of leisure, as they partly reflect wage levels. Finally, to specifically control for geographical variations in labour market conditions or social interaction effects, our controls include regional employment. In addition, in a robustness check, we focus on residents in Stockholm to restrict the sample to one specific labour market.
Results
Using samples of treated and matched comparison groups, Figures 3 and 4 display the differences in Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival in the labour force for males and females respectively. 15 The differences in survival rates are small over the entire follow-up period, and the point-wise 95 per cent confidence intervals of the differences do not diverge from zero. Table A .3 in the Appendix lists the underlying levels of survival rates and confidence intervals. 15 An estimator for the variance of the estimator is given in de Luna and Johansson (2007, Sec. 4 .2); using this tool, confidence intervals can be computed with a normal approximation.
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and there are no significant differences in the timing of the transition into retirement between the samples of treated and matched comparisons. 17 A different sampling aspect is that some individuals in the comparison group were registered in AE courses, but registrations amount to, on average, less than ten days of AE (less than 20 credits).
Omitting these observations does not change our results.
Second, the definition of treatment is altered. To begin with, we require a minimum of 250 registered credits (see Figures A.10 and A.11 in Appendix). However, the estimation results are not substantially different from what has been presented above.
The same applies if the minimum number of course credit registrations is set to 500 (i.e. equal to a schooling year) as well as when we conditioned on the content of the AE courses, notably with respect to vocational courses for males and health-related studies for females.
Third, we turn to alternative definitions of retirement. We first address whether the results are sensitive to our treatment of part-time retirees by using different threshold values of r it > 1.2, .8, and 0, with the last defining the timing of retirement as the first year when pension income exceeds zero (Figures A.12 and A.13) . Regardless of the definition of the outcome, the estimations have the same implications as before; that is, there are no significant differences in the timing of retirement between matched groups of treated and comparison groups. Next, because we may underestimate the measure of labour market activity by using earnings, we add unemployment benefits to the denominator of r it . However, this has little effect on the estimates. Nevertheless, one might argue that unemployment benefit transfers are received in a transition period from employment to retirement (Hallberg 2003) . In such a case, our ratio r it would instead exaggerate attachment to the labour force. If, for example, the untreated use this transition path more often, our estimated effects of AE on survival rates may be biased downwards. To check whether this is a problem, we compared the incidence and levels of unemployment benefits for 59-to 65-year-olds in each year in the period 1996-2004 for treated and untreated individuals. In the matched groups of males, there were no significant differences in incidence or levels. For females, equality in incidence could not be rejected for any year, while the benefit levels were significantly higher for untreated individuals in three of the nine years, namely, 1996, 2001 and 2002 . We conclude that this particular aspect does not seem to be of crucial importance.
Although it may seem a reasonable hypothesis, and despite running a number of robustness checks, we do not find any indications that additional investments in education at later stages of working life influence the retirement age. One may speculate regarding possible explanations for our findings. It may be the case that we have captured many individuals who merely "consumed" education. In other words, the motives behind these individuals' enrolment decisions may not have been related to labour market outcomes. This argument, however, requires that the consumption of education entails large amounts of AE because the results are robust to definitions of treatment that correspond to a year of full-time study measured in terms of course registrations. The "consumption of AE" argument is also contradicted by the positive earnings effects of AE reported in Stenberg and Westerlund (2008) and Stenberg (2009) as well as those reported using US data in Jacobson (2005b) . A different interpretation would be that a positive earnings effect generates an income effect that increases the demand for leisure, potentially counterbalancing a positive effect on labour supply. In addition, the timing of AE enrolment in our sample, 1986-1989, coincides with a strong economic expansion period with low levels of unemployment.
We cannot necessarily expect our results to generalise to all phases of a business cycle because different macroeconomic conditions may attract different groups of participants.
Summary and discussion
This paper has analysed whether adult education (AE) for prime-aged individuals at the compulsory or upper secondary level can be used as a policy measure to increase labour force participation during the later stages of working life. To answer this question, extended time-series data on AE and earnings are necessary. We use unique panel data on AE transcripts and annual earnings across 1979-2004 and 1982-2004, respectively. We further exploit the fact that, by international standards, AE has been exceptionally prevalent in Sweden.
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of individuals aged 42-55 (in 1986) with short educations. The groups we define as treated enrolled in AE during the Retraining the older workforce is often presumed to extend working life and is a cornerstone of both the European Union's so-called "Lisbon strategy" for growth and jobs and the OECD campaign for "active ageing". The results of this study indicate no effect of these efforts on the timing of the transition from labour force participation into retirement, thus weakening the economic rationale for AE in this case. According to our findings, proponents of AE for older workers would have to argue on the basis of its potentially positive effects on individual productivity while they remain in the labour force, and/or need to emphasize issues such as fairness, social equity, increased democracy and other similar considerations often included in the officially stated goals for publicly financed AE. As always, further studies that explore different economic environments will need to be conducted before stronger and more general conclusions can be drawn.
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